INDIANA HATE GAYS LAW: Conscientious objectors or lugubrious goobers?

As if taking a law school exam question and finding real-life people to act out the roles, the government of Indiana and religious conservatives flopped, then flipped.

 The notion that someone's conscientious objections should keep them from pulling a trigger is enshrined in American military law. During Vietnam, thousands of Americans were spared combat on their good-faith religious beliefs, which were rigorously examined by draft boards and courts. Roman Catholics had particular tough times, because rather than opposing all wars, the COs invoked the "just war" theory. My father was a World War II paratrooper whose priests understood the need to stop Hitler. But if I had become a CO in Vietnam, he would have supported me, as evidenced by his telling NBC News Today Show host Joe Garragiola, proudly, "My son is anti-war" (during a segment with 82nd vets in which Garragiola tried to bait the paratroopers about Vietnam protesters).

The notion that someone's conscientious objections should keep them from arranging flowers, baking a cake or making a pizza is absurd. There is no assertive conduct in arranging flowers, baking a cake or making a pizza. If anyone is so frail as to worry to what use their flowers, pizza or cake will be used, he needs to be in a velvet room, like Proust. These hick hacks are pretenders. They're going for KKK and fundamentalist votes.

 I've studied the religions of the world, from the Baltimore Catechism on. None preach flower, pizza or cake withholding. So a few pouty pretentious pompous bluenosers want exemptions from cake-baking?

 The Devil-food with their supercilious, excuse-making maladroit "complaints." Let the cake corporations bake cakes or go out of business. Business owners are not permitted to use religion as a basis for race discrimination or other invidious acts: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2349546/newman-v-piggie-park-enterprises-inc/ "Neither is the court impressed by defendant Bessinger's contention that the judicial enforcement of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 upon which this suit is predicated violates the free exercise of his religious beliefs in contravention of the First Amendment to the Constitution. It is unquestioned that the First Amendment prohibits compulsion by law of any creed or the practice of any form of religion, but it also safeguards the free exercise of one's chosen religion. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). The free exercise of one's beliefs, however, as distinguished from the absolute right to a belief, is subject to regulation when religious acts require accommodation to society. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944) (Mails to defraud); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (polygamy conviction); Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1943) (minor in company of ward distributing religious literature in violation of statute). Undoubtedly defendant Bessinger has a constitutional right to espouse the religious beliefs of his own choosing, however, he does not have the absolute right to exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other citizens. This court refuses to lend credence or support to his position that he has a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of the Negro race in his business establishments upon the ground that to do so would violate his sacred religious beliefs. The sole question for determination under the circumstances of instant case is whether any or all of defendants' eating establishments are places of public accommodation within the meaning and purview of Section 201 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Section 2000a).[2] In arriving at this determination the court is primarily concerned with the following factual and legal questions, which will be considered in inverse order hereinafter: (1) Is corporate defendant's establishments, or any of them, "principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises;" (2) Does said defendant at its establishments serve or offer "to serve interstate travelers;" and (3) has "a substantial portion of the food which it serves, * * * or other *946 products which it sells * * * moved in commerce"?

Lawyers/firms contracting, combining and conspiring to boycott the D.C. Superior Court were not treated with kid gloves as having exercised First Amendment rights. In Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not extend to a boycott of private lawyers. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)